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O P I N I O N 
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 Amifa Knight appeals the judgments of conviction and 
sentence on charges of perjury arising out of statements she 
made at a suppression hearing in the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands.  She seeks review of the District Court’s 
ruling on an evidentiary issue, its denial of her motion for 
acquittal, and its application of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines.  We find no error in the District Court’s 
determinations on these issues, and we will therefore affirm. 
 
 




 On May 12, 2008, Amon Thomas and Shadrock Frett 
engaged in a violent gun fight at Frett’s apartment in St. 
Croix, United States Virgin Islands.  Both men sustained 
gunshot wounds which resulted in their hospitalization at 
Juan Luis Hospital in St. Croix.  Thomas, less severely 
injured than Frett, was discharged on May 16, 2008.  Five 
days later, on May 21, 2008, at approximately 3:50 a.m., six 
masked gunmen entered the hospital, located Frett, and shot 
him to death. 
 
 A police investigation revealed that the gunmen 
entered the hospital through an employee entrance with the 
benefit of an employee “swipe card,” proceeded directly to 
Frett’s room, committed the murder, and left in under three 
minutes.  Based on these circumstances, investigators 
suspected that a hospital employee may have been involved in 
the crime in some capacity.  They examined the hospital’s 
electronic patient records system, which showed that Knight, 
an admissions clerk, had accessed Frett’s records at 7:24 p.m. 
on May 20, 2008, just hours before he was killed.  
Investigators subsequently obtained Knight’s cell phone 
records, which indicated that she had telephone conversations 
with Thomas’s brother, Halik Milligan, at 7 p.m. and 7:30 
p.m. that same evening. 
 
 On January 26, 2009, Thomas Drummond, a special 
agent from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Dino 
Herbert, an officer of the Virgin Islands Police Department, 
jointly interviewed Knight about the hospital shooting.  
During her questioning, Knight stated to the investigators that 
she had no prior knowledge that someone would enter the 
hospital and kill Frett.  She claimed that she did not know 
Frett’s room number on May 20, 2008, and that she did not 
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remember accessing the hospital’s records system to ascertain 
it that night.  She admitted that Milligan was her boyfriend 
but denied that she had any phone conversations with him on 
May 20th.  She further stated that she never disclosed Frett’s 
room number to anyone. 
 
 The following day, January 27, 2009, Herbert and 
Drummond obtained a warrant and arrested Knight for 
making false statements to a federal agent on the basis of this 
interview.  They again questioned her, but this time 
confronted her with her cell phone records, showing that she 
had been in contact with Milligan on the night of Frett’s 
murder, and with a printout from the hospital’s records 
system, indicating that she had looked up his room number 
that night.  Faced with this evidence, Knight admitted that, 
prior to May 20, 2008, Milligan had asked her whether she 
could obtain Frett’s room number and that she informed him 
that she could.  She stated that at 7 p.m. on May 20th, 
Milligan called her and specifically asked her for Frett’s room 
number.  Knight admitted that she then accessed the 
hospital’s records system to determine Frett’s location, and 
that at 7:30 p.m., she called Milligan to inform him that she 
had this information.  According to Knight, Milligan came to 
the hospital approximately one hour later, at which point she 
gave him Frett’s room number.  She admitted that she had 
been aware of a plan to kill Frett prior to the time that it was 
carried out. 
 
 On February 19, 2009, Knight was indicted on six 
counts of making false statements to a federal officer, in 
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violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2).
1
  She moved to suppress 
the statements she had made following her arrest on January 
27th, arguing that they were coerced and that she had not 
been properly advised of her Miranda rights.  A hearing was 
held on Knight’s suppression motion on April 16, 2009, at 
which she testified about her January 27th interrogation.  She 
also made a number of statements concerning events at the 
hospital on the night of Frett’s murder.  First, she stated that 
she had accessed Frett’s electronic hospital records three or 
four times on the evening of May 20, 2008.  Second, she 
claimed that she did so in order to determine his room number 
so that she could provide it to friends and family of Frett’s 
who wanted to visit him and whose telephone calls had been 
transferred to her by the hospital’s telephone operator.  Third, 
she claimed that Milligan was a friend of Frett’s and wanted 
to visit him at the hospital. 
 
 On August 13, 2009, the Government issued a 
superseding indictment in Knight’s case, charging that each 
of these three statements constituted perjury, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 1621(1).  A charge of conspiring in Frett’s 
                                                 
1
 Knight was specifically charged with falsely stating 
to Special Agent Drummond that (1) she did not know on 
May 20, 2008, that anyone was planning to enter the hospital 
to kill Frett; (2) on May 20, 2008, she did not know Frett’s 
hospital room number; (3) she did not on May 20, 2008, make 
calls to or receive calls from two telephone numbers assigned 
to Milligan; (4) she did not speak with Milligan on May 20, 
2008; (5) she did not recall whether she searched the 
hospital’s records system on May 20, 2008, to ascertain 
Frett’s room number; and (6) she had not disclosed Frett’s 
room number to anyone. 
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murder, in violation of 14 V.I.C. §§ 551(1) and 922(a) (1), 
was also added.  Knight was ultimately acquitted on the six 
original charges of making false statements to a federal agent 
and on the conspiracy charge.  She was convicted, however, 
on the three perjury charges and sentenced to 36 months 
imprisonment.
2
  Knight now appeals, arguing that the District 
Court erred in (1) admitting irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial 
evidence pertaining to the May 12th shooting at Frett’s 
apartment and the May 21st shooting at the hospital, (2) 
denying her motion for acquittal as untimely, and (3) 
sentencing her pursuant to a provision of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines that is applicable only to perjury that is 
in respect to a criminal offense. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C. § 
1612, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
will review the District Court’s decision regarding the 
admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.  United 
States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 768 n.14 (3d Cir. 2000).  Our 
review of the dismissal of Knight’s motion for acquittal as 
untimely, however, is plenary.  United States v. Mike, 655 
F.3d 167, 174 (3d Cir. 2001).  Finally, with respect to the 
District Court’s factual finding in applying the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines, our inquiry is whether it was clearly 
                                                 
2
 Knight was also charged with one additional count of 
perjury, which related to her testimony at the suppression 
hearing that she never expressed to anyone that she had prior 
knowledge of a plan to kill Frett at the hospital.  She was 
found not guilty on this charge. 
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erroneous.  See United States v. Ali, 508 F.3d 136, 143 (3d 
Cir. 2007). 
 
A. Admission of Evidence Related to the May 12th & 
May 21st Shootings 
 
 Prior to trial, Knight moved in limine to exclude 
evidence regarding both the gun battle between Frett and 
Thomas on May 12, 2008, and the subsequent killing of Frett 
on May 21, 2008, at the hospital.  The motion was denied, 
and the jury heard evidence of both of these events.  Knight 
contends on appeal that this evidence was irrelevant to the 
perjury charges and therefore should have been excluded 
under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  She further 
argues that even assuming its relevancy, the evidence was 
unfairly prejudicial and thus should have been excluded on 
the basis of Rule 403. 
 
 We conclude, however, that the evidence was not 
irrelevant to the perjury charges because it put into context 
why Knight was accessing Frett’s hospital records and the 
nature of her relationship with Milligan and through him with 
Thomas.  This inclusion  of evidence of both shootings helped 
to explain why Knight committed perjury by lying about her 
access to the electronic hospital records and the reasons for 
that access. 
 
 Moreover, Knight’s argument overlooks the fact that 
she was concurrently on trial for conspiracy to murder Frett.  
In order to establish her guilt on this charge, the government 
had to prove that she and at least one other person (1) 
intentionally entered into an agreement (2) with the purpose 
of killing Frett (3) with malice aforethought.  See 14 V.I.C. §§ 
8 
 
551(1), 922(a)(1); see also United States v. Reyeros, 537 F.3d 
270, 277 to78 (3d Cir. 2008) (setting forth elements of 
conspiracy).  The government sought to meet this burden by 
showing that Knight participated in a plot to kill Frett by 
obtaining his hospital room number and disclosing it to 
Milligan so that Frett’s assailants could locate him and 
complete their mission.  Any evidence that has a tendency to 
make this account more probable than it otherwise would be 
is relevant.  See Fed. R. Evid. 401.  Evidence related to the 
May 12th shooting at Frett’s apartment is also relevant 
because it suggests a motive for the conspiracy to kill Frett 
and provides a link between that conspiracy and Knight.   
 
Finally, we reject Knight’s contention that evidence of 
these shootings should have been excluded on account of 
unfair prejudice.  “Unfair prejudice means an undue tendency 
to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though 
not necessarily, an emotional one.” Fed. R. Evid. 403 
(advisory committee’s note).  Relevant evidence may be 
excluded for this reason only if its “probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice.”  
Fed. R. Evid. 403 (emphasis added).  In determining whether 
evidence must be excluded as unfairly prejudicial, we owe 
“considerable deference” to the judgment of the District 
Court, United States v. Guerrero, 803 F.2d 783, 785 (3d Cir. 
1986), and we will not disturb its ruling unless it was 
“arbitrary or irrational.”  United States v. Universal Rehab. 
Servs. (PA), Inc., 205 F.3d 657, 665 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc).  
As we have outlined, evidence of both shootings was relevant 
to all the charges against Knight in significant ways.  Knight 
contends, however, that this relevance is trumped by the risk 
that the evidence might have led the jury to convict her in 
order to punish someone for the shootings rather than because 
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of a conclusion that she was guilty of perjury.  We find no 
merit in this argument.  With respect to the May 12th 
shooting at Frett’s apartment, Knight makes no claim that the 
Government alleged or even implied that she had any 
involvement, and we therefore see no risk that the jury would 
have sought to punish her for that incident.  Regarding the 
May 21st hospital shooting, evidence of that shooting is 
critical to explain the perjury.  Moreover, to the extent that 
the jury was motivated to convict Knight in order to punish 
someone for that shooting, it could have found her guilty on 
the conspiracy charge.  We see no logic in Knight’s argument 
that the jury would acquit her on the conspiracy charge but 
punish her for the underlying events by convicting her of 
perjury. 
 
We conclude that evidence pertaining to the May 12th 
and May 21st shootings was relevant and not unfairly 
prejudicial.  Its admission at trial was therefore appropriate. 
 
B. Denial of Knight’s Motion for Acquittal 
 
Knight also claims that the District Court erred in 
denying her motion for acquittal, which she sought after the 
jury returned its verdict.  The District Court denied that 
motion on the grounds that it was untimely.  A motion for a 
judgment of acquittal sought after a jury verdict must be filed 
within 14 days after the verdict or after the court discharges 
the jury, whichever is later.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(1).  This 
time limit may be extended for good cause before its 
expiration, or even afterwards if the defendant’s failure to act 
was due to excusable neglect.  Fed R. Crim. P. 45(b)(1).  A 
district court has no jurisdiction, however, to consider a 
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motion for acquittal that is untimely.  United States v. 
Gaydos, 108 F.3d 505, 512 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
The jury returned its verdict in Knight’s case on 
December 22, 2009, meaning that her motion for acquittal 
initially needed to be filed by January 5, 2010.  On December 
29, 2009, she filed a motion for an extension of the time to 
file it.  The District Court granted this request and gave her 
until 30 days after receipt of the trial transcript to make her 
filing.  The transcript was available on March 16, 2010, 
rendering Knight’s motion due by April 15, 2010.  She did 
not submit it until July 9, 2010, 85 days beyond the due date.  
She also failed to make any showing of excusable neglect.  
Knight’s motion was accordingly untimely, and the District 
Court was without jurisdiction to consider it.  We conclude 
therefore that the denial of her motion was appropriate. 
 
C. Application of § 2J1.3(c) of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines 
 
Sentences for perjury convictions such as Knight’s are 
governed by § 2J1.3 of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines.  In the ordinary case, that provision dictates a 
base offense level of 14 and a corresponding sentence range 
of 15 to 21 months imprisonment.  U.S.S.G. § 2J1.3(a).  
Where perjury is “in respect to a criminal offense,” however, 
it  instructs that the defendant be sentenced pursuant to § 
2X3.1 as if she were an “Accessory After the Fact” to that 
criminal offense.  Id. at § 2J1.3(c).  The District Court applied 
this cross-reference to Knight in light of its finding that her 
perjurious statements were in respect to the crime of first 
degree murder, and as a result determined that the Guidelines 
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range was 60 months.
3
  Knight contends that her perjury was 
not in respect to the offense of first degree murder and that 
her sentence must therefore be vacated. 
 
Other courts have found that “[p]erjury is in respect to 
a criminal offense where the defendant knew or had reason to 
know, at the time of [her] perjury, that [her] testimony 
concerned such a criminal offense.”  United States v. Leon-
Reyes, 177 F.3d 816, 824 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. 
Flemmi, 402 F.3d 79, 96 n.28 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Blanton, 281 F.3d 771, 776 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. 
Leifson, 568 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2009).  We agree 
with this interpretation of § 2J1.3(c) of the Sentencing 
Guidelines and adopt it here.  Applying this standard, we find 
that Knight’s perjury was in respect to Frett’s murder.  Her 
perjury convictions related to her testimony that (1) she 
accessed Frett’s hospital records three or four times on the 
evening of May 20, 2008;
4
 (2) she did so in order to be able to 
                                                 
3
 The Guidelines dictate that the base offense level for 
an accessory after the fact be “6 levels lower than the offense 
level for the underlying offense” but “not more than level 
30.”  U.S.S.G. § 2X3.1(a).  The base offense level for the 
underlying offense here, first degree murder, is 43, id. at § 
2A1.1(a), and 6 levels less would be 37, so the maximum 
offense level of 30 and its corresponding sentence range of 97 
to121 months would be triggered.  However, because the 
crime of perjury has a statutory maximum sentence of 60 
months, 18 U.S.C. § 1621, that limit applies here. 
 
4
 The Government’s theory was that Knight falsely 
claimed to have accessed Frett’s records three or four times, 
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provide his room number to friends and family who were 
making telephone calls to the hospital because they wanted to 
visit him; and (3) that Milligan was a friend of Frett’s and 
called on May 20, 2008, because he wanted to visit Frett in 
the hospital.  She gave this testimony at a suppression hearing 
in criminal proceedings concerning charges that she had made 
false statements to federal agents specifically investigating 
Frett’s murder.  All of the testimony, moreover, was given in 
response to questions which pertained to events at the hospital 
on the very night that Frett was killed and which were clearly 
being asked to establish facts surrounding that crime.  Finally, 
based on her initial interview by investigators on January 
26th, her post-arrest interrogation on January 27th, and the 
details of the charges of making false statements to a federal 
agent on which she had already been indicted, Knight was 
aware of the government’s theory that Frett’s murder had 
been facilitated by her obtaining his room location from the 
hospital’s records system and disclosing it to Milligan.  For 
these reasons, we conclude that Knight knew or had reason to 
know that the testimony underlying her perjury convictions 
concerned Frett’s murder.  Accordingly, the District Court did 
not commit clear error in finding that the perjury was in 





                                                                                                             
rather than just once, in order to corroborate her claim that 
she had done so in response to multiple inquiries from his 
friends and family members and to mask the conspicuousness 
of her single instance of access in the short interval between 
two phone calls with Milligan. 
13 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the 
District Court’s judgments of conviction and sentence. 
 
